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INTRODUCTION
Organ donation creates an opportunity for prisoners to give back
to the community whose social norms have been violated and it pro-
vides an opportunity to help a fellow citizen who desperately needs
help. . . .  And should the donor happen to be a death row inmate
who is unlikely to see a release date, allowing good to come out of
an otherwise hopeless situation only heightens the benefit to the
institution and the community in general.1
In December 2001, Christian Longo killed his wife and three chil-
dren and sank their bodies in an Oregon lake before heading to Mex-
ico to celebrate the New Year.2  To facilitate this escapade, Longo
stole the identity of a New York Times reporter, Michael Finkel.  In
2003, Longo was sentenced to death for these murders.  As infamous
as he became for his acts,3 Longo is perhaps better known as the face
of death row inmates’ efforts to become organ donors.4
Unlike U.S. citizens generally, who are encouraged to become or-
gan donors through drivers’ license designations, advance directives,
and state registries, in most instances inmates are barred from donat-
ing their organs until release.  For death row inmates like Longo, and
the more than 3,000 men and women who are not on death row but
die in prison each year,5 this proves to be a permanent bar.
It is clear that many inmates would choose to become donors if pro-
vided an opportunity.  In Utah, for example, where the 2013 passage
of a state law allowed inmates to register as posthumous organ donors
for the first time,6 nearly 250 signed up within weeks of the law’s en-
1. CHRISTIAN M. LONGO, G.A.V.E.: GIFTS OF ANATOMICAL VALUE FROM THE EVERYONE  9
(rev. Dec. 15, 2009), https://web.archive.org/web/20110427230313/http://www.gavelife.org/up
loads/Living_Donations_By_Inmates.pdf.
2. Michael Finkel, How I Convinced a Death-Row Murderer Not To Die, ESQUIRE (Dec. 21,
2009), http://www.esquire.com/features/christian-longo-0110.
3. The development of a relationship between Finkel and Longo during this time was the
subject of the 2015 film True Story. See Jeff Baker, ‘True Story’: A Horrific Oregon Murder
Becomes a Jonah Hill-James Franco Movie, OREGONLIVE (Mar. 1, 2014, 6:11 AM), http://
www.oregonlive.com/books/index.ssf/2014/03/true_story_a_horrific_oregon_m.html.
4. Longo published a New York Times editorial on the topic and is the founder of Gifts of
Anatomical Value from Everyone, an organization that advocates for expanding the pool of
potential organ donors.  Christian Longo, Opinion, Giving Life After Death Row, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/opinion/06longo.html. See generally G.A.V.E.,
https://gavelife.wordpress.com/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2016) (providing more information on
Longo’s organization).
5. See MARGARET E. NOONAN & SCOTT GINDER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 242186, MOR-
TALITY IN LOCAL JAILS AND STATE PRISONS, 2000–2011-STATISTICAL TABLES 19 tbl.14 (Aug.
2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mljsp0011.pdf (listing the total state prisoner deaths,
excluding executions).
6. Inmate Medical Donation Act, 2013 Utah Laws 1 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-13-44
(LexisNexis 2014)).
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actment.7  The Maricopa County, Arizona Sheriff’s Office claims that
16,500 inmates have registered there to be posthumous donors.8  Cou-
pled with the efforts of inmates like Longo to donate, these examples
show that significant numbers of inmates are willing to be organ do-
nors.  Yet in almost all instances, they are denied the opportunity to
do so if they die prior to being released.
To date, the scholarship in favor of allowing inmates to donate their
organs has largely focused on the benefit these donations could offer
patients languishing on organ transplant lists, while objections center
on the vulnerability of the imprisoned potential donors and their in-
ability to make decisions freely.  A donor-focused case for donation,
however, is missing in this debate. This Article fills that gap by setting
out the philosophical case for allowing prison inmates to fill this role,
even though the aggregate increase in the supply of transplantable or-
gans would be small.
As an initial matter, allowing prisoners to donate their organs upon
death does not interfere with the goals of punishment.  As long as no
sentence reductions or other benefits are offered in exchange for do-
nation, allowing prisoners to choose whether to donate their organs
upon death should have no effect on either the general or specific
deterrence value of punishment:  Inability to donate is not integral to
the punishment itself.  Moreover, permitting donation allows society
to condemn the acts that led to imprisonment, which is needed to
achieve the retributive goal of punishment, without denying the pris-
oner’s inherent humanity.
Beyond the absence of a reason not to allow donation, allowing in-
mates to choose whether to become posthumous donors would for-
ward the rehabilitative aim of punishment.  A prisoner choosing to
donate is engaging in long-term planning, forging connections to a
broader community, and expressing empathy for others, all of which
help overcome some of the factors that may have led to his imprison-
ment in the first place.  Even in instances in which the choice to do-
nate might not cause these changes, it facilitates a display of
rehabilitation that is otherwise denied to many inmates.
7. New Utah Law Allows Organ Donations from Prisoners; Nearly 250 Sign Up, NBC NEWS:
VITALS (Apr. 13, 2013, 3:42 PM) [hereinafter Utah Donations from Prisoners], http://vitals.
nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/13/17674231-new-utah-law-allows-organ-donations-from-prisoners-
nearly-250-sign-up.
8. See Press Release, Maricopa Cty. Sheriff’s Office, Arpaio’s “I DO” Program (Inmates Will-
ing To Donate Their Organs) Has Them Joining National Drive (Apr. 29, 2015) [hereinafter
Press Release, “I DO” Program], https://www.mcso.org/MultiMedia/PressRelease/Organ%20Do
nor.pdf.
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More abstractly, yet no less importantly, providing prisoners with
the choice of whether to donate their organs provides them with an
opportunity to exercise their agency.  This remains true whether the
prisoner chooses to donate or not, and whether he dies in prison or is
released.  In any case, he has been able to make an important decision
in a context where decision-making is otherwise largely denied to him.
For an inmate who is released, the decision whether to donate may
provide him with a valuable sense of self-efficacy and control.  And
for those who die while imprisoned, it is a final act of autonomy.
Part II of this Article describes the current status of the law with
respect to organ donation by inmates and efforts to allow such dona-
tion, and reviews the literature on point.9  Part III, then, addresses the
prevailing objections to inmate donation and finds them largely
rooted in paternalism, speculation, and stigma.10  It acknowledges,
however, that concerns about the possible impact that allowing dona-
tion would have on the application of the death penalty are warranted
but resolvable.  Next, Part IV begins to make the affirmative case for
posthumous donation, arguing that it is consistent with the aims of
punishment.11  Finally, Part V articulates a donor-focused case for
permitting donation:  Posthumous donation would allow inmates to
exercise their agency and, in so doing, effect or reflect their rehabilita-
tion, which is a larger social good.12
II. BACKGROUND ON POSTHUMOUS DONATION BY PRISONERS
The idea that prisoners should be allowed to donate their organs is
not novel.  In practice, though, it is almost unheard of.  Prisoners have
only been allowed to become living organ donors in a small number of
cases and usually only if they are related to the transplant recipient.
And authorities have almost universally rejected efforts by prisoners
to become donors at death.
A. The Legal Landscape of Organ Donation
Two statutes govern organ donation in the United States generally.
The National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA),13 a federal statute, au-
thorizes the creation of organ procurement organizations and prohib-
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See infra Part V.
13. Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
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its payment for organs for transplant.14  The Revised Uniform
Anatomic Gift Act (UAGA),15 which has been enacted by forty-six
states and the District of Columbia,16 provides that any adult may
commit to being an organ donor.17  The United Network of Organ
Sharing (UNOS), a private, nonprofit organization, administers the
procurement network authorized by NOTA and used by states in ac-
tualizing UAGA.18
Neither NOTA nor UAGA prohibits—or otherwise specifically
contemplates—organ donation by inmates.  The UNOS Ethics Com-
mittee has taken up the question of donation by death row inmates,
announcing that it “opposes any strategy or proposed statute regard-
ing organ donation from condemned prisoners until all of the poten-
tial ethical concerns (e.g., coercion, method of execution, issues of
informed consent) have been satisfactorily addressed.”19  Thus, while
the Ethics Committee does not currently endorse this type of dona-
tion, its conclusion leaves some room for it.
Although few jurisdictions expressly address posthumous donation
by inmates,20 it is widely believed that nearly every one prevents it.21
Apart from outright prohibitions, there are also practical concerns im-
peding posthumous donation.  All currently accepted methods of exe-
cution—lethal injection, gas, electrocution, firing squad, and
14. See id. §§ 301, 372.
15. REV. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N) (rev. 2009).
16. Anatomical Gift Act (2006), UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title
=Anatomical%20Gift%20Act%20%282006%29 (last visited Jan. 6, 2016); see, e.g., ALA. CODE
§§ 22-19-160 to 19-184 (LexisNexis Supp. 2014);  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-3220 to -3244 (Supp.
2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-5-201 to 5-25535 (2013).  The Pennsylvania legislature is currently
considering adopting UAGA. Anatomical Gift Act (2006), supra note 16. R
17. Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (2006) § 4, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS (revised 2009).
18. Id. § 4.
19. The Ethics of Organ Donation from Condemned prisoners, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/ethics/the-ethics-of-organ-donation-from-con
demned-prisoners/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2015).
20. The Federal Bureau of Prisons is an exception.  It explicitly prohibits posthumous dona-
tion. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROGRAM STATEMENT 6031.04, PATIENT CARE 44–45 (June 3,
2014) [hereinafter PATIENT CARE PROGRAM STATEMENT], http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/
6031_004.pdf.
21. See, e.g., Eric Meslin, Death Row Organ Donation, IND. U. CTR. FOR BIOETHICS, http://
bioethics.iu.edu/reference-center/topic-guides/deathrow/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2015) (collecting
the failed efforts by state legislatures to allow posthumous donation by death row inmates and
reporting that all states prohibit posthumous organ donation by death row prisoners). But see,
e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10A:16-9.1 (2014) (allowing inmates to register as posthumous organ
donors and permitting living donation in extraordinary circumstances); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-
13-44 (LexisNexis 2014) (requiring the Utah Department of Corrections to allow organ donation
by inmates who die while incarcerated); Press Release,“I DO” Program, supra note 8. R
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hanging—render some or all organs unsuitable for transplant.22  Even
for natural deaths in prison, the delay in procurement that necessarily
results from transportation between a prison and a transplant center
would likely leave few organs suitable for transplant.23  Moreover,
rates of hepatitis and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection
in prison populations suggest that organs from many prisoners would
have only limited utility.24  Thus, there is scant opportunity to apply
NOTA or UAGA inside prison walls.
B. History of Prison Donation
Despite the general prohibition that exists in the United States with
respect to posthumous organ donation by prisoners, we have allowed
the use of their body materials in other limited ways, specifically with
blood crediting programs, living organ donations, and, in at least two
instances, cadaveric donation.
1. Blood Crediting Programs
Using inmates as sources of body materials is not unprecedented in
the United States.  Confronted with persistent blood shortages in the
1950s, several states implemented so-called “blood credit” or “blood-
time” programs.25  In Massachusetts, for example, inmates received
five days’ credit for each pint of blood they donated.26  Because in-
mates could donate as many as four times each year, the program ini-
tially offered up to a twenty-day reduction in sentence length for each
year the inmate participated.  This credit later increased to ten days
per pint, with donation opportunities coming every eight weeks.27
Thus, the potential credit rose to a little over two months per year.
22. Brandi L. Kellam, Comment, A Life for a Life: Why Death Row Inmates Should Be Al-
lowed To Donate Their Organs Following Execution, 81 UMKC L. REV. 461, 479 (2012). But see
Shu S. Lin et al., Prisoners on Death Row Should Be Accepted as Organ Donors, 93 ANNALS
THORACIC SURGERY 1773, 1774 (2012) (arguing that some lethal injection protocols would not
preclude organ donation if performed in a hospital setting).
23. Lin et al., supra note 22, at 1777. R
24. See infra notes 93–98 and accompanying text (discussing how prisoners are more likely to R
have diseases such as HIV, making their organs transplantable at a lower rate than in the popu-
lation more generally).
25. See Mark F. Anderson, The Prisoner as Organ Donor, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 951, 972
(2000) (listing programs in Alabama, California, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, and Virginia); Jamila Jefferson-Jones, The Exchange of Inmate Organs for Liberty:
Diminishing the “Yuck Factor” in the Bioethics Repugnance Debate, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
105, 132 (2013).
26. 1959 Mass. Acts 153 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127, § 129(A)
(1959) (repealed 1989)); see also Anderson, supra note 25, at 971–72 (discussing Massachusetts’s R
blood credit program).
27. Anderson, supra note 25, at 971–72. R
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Although some states discontinued their blood credit programs in
the 1980s, likely in response to concerns about HIV and other blood-
borne pathogens,28 the programs have continued in other states.29
The practice of blood credit programs demonstrates a willingness by
the states to bargain with inmates, exchanging liberty for their body
materials.  And, on an even more basic level, it shows an acceptance
of the use of some body materials from prison populations that has
not carried over to organs.
2. Living Organ Donation by Prisoners
Within tight constraints, some U.S. jurisdictions allow living organ
donation by prisoners.  The Federal Bureau of Prisons, for example,
allows inmates to serve as living donors for members of their immedi-
ate family as long as the families bear the cost of the procedure.30  The
Texas Department of Criminal Justice policy only permits living dona-
tion by general population inmates, not death row inmates, and the
donation typically occurs only when the intended recipient is a family
member.31  The South Carolina Department of Corrections provides
education about tissue and organ donation to prisoners and allows do-
nation if it determines that there is no present threat to security.32  As
with the federal approach, the South Carolina Department of Correc-
tions will not bear any costs associated with donation.33
Some living donations do occur.  In the early 1990s, a female inmate
in federal prison donated a kidney to her child.34  In 1995, Delaware
allowed a death row inmate, Steven Shelton, to donate a kidney to his
mother.35  The following year, California permitted David Patterson,
28. Jefferson-Jones, supra note 25, at 132. R
29. Oklahoma and Virginia continue to use blood credit programs. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 57,
§ 65 (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-191 (Supp. 2013); see also Campbell Robertson, For Offend-
ers Who Can’t Pay, It’s a Pint of Blood or Jail Time, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2015, http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/10/20/us/for-offenders-who-cant-pay-its-a-pint-of-blood-or-jail-time.html
(detailing an Alabama judge’s offer to criminal offenders).  Alabama’s blood credit program
continued until 2015. See H.B. 40, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2015) (repealing ALA. CODE § 14-9-3 (1975)).
30. PATIENT CARE PROGRAM STATEMENT, supra note 20, at 44–45. R
31. Donny J. Perales, Comment, Rethinking the Prohibition of Death Row Prisoners as Organ
Donors: A Possible Lifeline to Those on Organ Donor Waiting Lists, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 687,
703–04 (2003).
32. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-1-285(A)–(B) (Supp. 2014).
33. Id. § 24-1-285(C).
34. Clifford Earle Bartz, Operation Blue, ULTRA: DION—The Donation Inmate Organ Net-
work, 13 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 37, 39 (2003).
35. Kellam, supra note 22, at 468. R
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who was then serving a sentence for burglary, to donate a kidney to
his daughter.36
In other cases, inmates have come close to donation, but medical
suitability thwarted their attempts.  In 1996, the Alabama Supreme
Court stayed the execution of David Larry Nelson so that doctors
could determine if he would be a suitable kidney donor for his
brother.37  Nelson’s brother, however, was apparently too ill for sur-
gery,38 and Nelson died in prison in 2009.39
More recently, a Mississippi case involving sisters Gladys and Jamie
Scott captured popular40 and scholarly41 attention.  In 2011, Missis-
sippi’s then-Governor, Haley Barbour, released the sisters, who were
serving life sentences for their participation in a 1993 armed rob-
bery,42 on the condition that Gladys donate her kidney to Jamie.43
36. See Evelyn Nieves, Girl Awaits Father’s 2d Kidney, and Decision by Medical Ethicists,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/05/us/girl-awaits-father-s-2d-kidney-
and-decision-by-medical-ethicists.html?pagewanted=print; Kellam, supra note 22, at 468.  Three R
years later, Patterson—who was still in prison—sought to donate his remaining kidney to his
daughter after the first one began to fail, but an ethics panel denied his request.  Marisa Lagos,
Kidney Transplant Recipient Dies/Former Oakland Woman’s Father Donated His Organ While in
Prison, SFGATE (Mar. 19, 2007, 4:38 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Kidney-trans
plant-recipient-dies-Former-Oakland-2608485.php.
37. Jay Reeves, Transplant Ethics, BMARSH: UPBEAT ARCHIVE (Dec. 6, 1996), http://www.b
marsh.com/upbeat/upbt9701.
38. Liz Klimas, Should an Inmate on Death Row Be Allowed To Donate Organs? Take Our
Poll, BLAZE (Nov. 15, 2013, 10:25 PM), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/11/15/should-an-
inmate-on-death-row-be-allowed-to-donate-organs-take-our-poll/.
39. Connie Baggett, Death Row Inmate David Larry Nelson Dies in Holman Infirmary,
AL.COM: BLOG (Nov. 3, 2009, 11:35 AM), http://blog.al.com/live/2009/11/death_row_inmate_da
vid_larry_n.html.
40. See, e.g., Timothy Williams, Jailed Sisters Are Released for Kidney Transplant, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/08/us/08sisters.html; Susan Donaldson James, Sup-
porters Applaud Plan To Release Scott Sisters in Kidney Deal, ABC NEWS (Dec. 30, 2010), http://
abcnews.go.com/US/scott-sisters-released-16-years-prison-kidney-deal/story?id=12508754.
41. Scholars’ responses to the Scotts’ plan were mixed.  Some argued that their case opened
the door to the benefits of living donation by inmates. See, e.g., Aviva M. Goldberg & Joel
Frader, Prisoners as Living Organ Donors: The Case of the Scott Sisters, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Oct.
2011, at 15, 15–16; Jefferson-Jones, supra note 25, at 131–34.  Others argued that the case sets an R
alarming precedent that allows inmates to bargain their body materials for release.  See, e.g.,
Jennifer L. Visconti, Note, Exchanging a Kidney for Freedom: The Illegality of Conditioning
Prison Release on Organ Donation, 38 N. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 199, 200
(2012).
42. The saga of the Scott sisters began Christmas Eve that year, when they asked two men for
a ride to the sisters’ parents’ home.  Ward Schaefer, The Tragic Case of the Scott Sisters, JACKSON
FREE PRESS (Nov. 3, 2010, 3:45 PM), http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2010/nov/03/the-
tragic-case-of-the-scott-sisters/.  Later that evening, three other young men, the so-called “Pat-
rick boys,” robbed the two men who drove the Scotts home. Id.  The victims walked away re-
lieved of the $11 to $200 they carried (accounts conflict) but otherwise unharmed. Id. The
Scotts insisted that they had nothing to do with the robbery and that they parted ways with the
victims before the robbery. Id. The Patrick boys, however, accepted lesser sentences in ex-
change for their testimony against the Scotts. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-4\DPL402.txt unknown Seq: 9 11-OCT-16 7:37
2016] POSTHUMOUS ORGAN DONATION 1201
Mississippi permitted the sisters to leave the state immediately on re-
lease, a liberty not typically granted to recent parolees.44  At the time
of their release, it was not even clear that the Scotts were a sufficiently
close match for transplant.45  Two months after their release, doctors
determined that Jamie would need to lose about 100 pounds before
she could receive a transplant, while Gladys would need lose about
forty pounds and quit smoking before she could donate.46  Today, al-
most six years after their release from prison, the donation has not
occurred, and the sisters have been barred from reentering Missis-
sippi.47  Still, Governor Barbour’s willingness to release Gladys and
Jamie Scott under these circumstances illustrates a willingness to ac-
cept living donation by prisoners at times, even if it means they do not
finish their sentences.
Other inmates’ attempts to donate have been unsuccessful because
of state policy.  For example, in November 2013, Ohio Governor John
Kasich postponed the execution of Ronald Phillips for the 1993 mur-
der and rape of his girlfriend’s three-year-old daughter to determine
whether Phillips could donate his “nonvital organs” before execu-
tion.48  Phillips sought to donate a kidney to his mother, but Ohio
officials ultimately denied his request because there would be insuffi-
cient time for him to recover between the surgery and his scheduled
execution.49
There is at least one reported case of an inmate challenging a state’s
restrictions on living donation.  Calvin Campbell, who was serving on
Florida’s death row, turned to the courts during his effort to donate
43. Williams, supra note 40.  It is widely believed that Governor Barbour, then a presumptive R
2012 presidential candidate, allowed the Scotts’ release with his public image in mind. See e.g.,
Jefferson-Jones, supra note 25, at 130–31; Brad Knickerbocker, NAACP: Sisters’ Release Makes R
Mississippi Gov. Haley Barbour ‘Shining Example,’ CHRIST. SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 30, 2010),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/The-Vote/2010/1230/NAACP-Sisters-release-makes-
Mississippi-Gov.-Haley-Barbour-shining-example.  See infra Part III.A.3, for a discussion of the
Scott sisters’ release and its implications for cadaveric donation by inmates.
44. Goldberg & Frader, supra note 41, at 15. R
45. Williams, supra note 40. R
46. Cindy E. Rodriguez, Scott Sisters Must Lose Weight To Comply with Prison Release, ABC
NEWS (Feb. 24, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/scott-sisters-slim-kidney-transplant-place/
story?id=12983690.
47. Jimmie E. Gates, Scott Sisters Denied Travel to Mississippi, HATTIESBURG AM. (Aug. 11,
2015, 8:33 PM), http://www.hattiesburgamerican.com/story/news/crime/2015/08/11/scott-sisters-
barred-state/31503011/.
48. Alan Johnson, Kasich Postpones Execution of Inmate Who Wants To Donate Organs, CO-
LUMBUS DISPATCH (Nov. 14, 2013, 7:10 AM), http://www.dispatch.com//content/stories/local/
2013/11/13/kasich-stops-execution-of-phillips.html.
49. Associated Press, Ohio: State Rejects Death Row Inmate’s Request To Be Organ Donor,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/us/ohio-state-rejects-death-row-
inmates-request-to-be-organ-donor.html.
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his kidney to an ailing Florida youth.50  Campbell brought suit pursu-
ant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that he had a constitutional right to
donate his kidney.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
rejected the notion that Campbell was entitled to donate, explaining:
“If he were free, the appellant would have the right to donate one of
his kidneys to whomever he desired.  He has no right to the relief he
seeks, however, in consequence of his incarceration.”51  The panel
held that considerations of security and administrative expense out-
weighed any constitutional deprivation, but it did not deny that Camp-
bell might have a right, constitutional or otherwise, to donate.52
Thus, although it is sometimes permitted, living organ donation by
inmates is indisputably rare.  Yet it is still relatively more common
than opportunities for posthumous donation for inmates who die prior
to release.
3. Posthumous Organ Donation by Prisoners
There is some history of cadaveric organ donation by inmates, al-
though none recent.  In both known cases, death row inmates donated
organs after execution.  In 1977, after the State of Utah executed Gary
Gilmore, doctors harvested Gilmore’s pituitary gland, eyes, kidneys,
and liver—all according to his wishes—for possible transplant.53
Seven years later, when the State of North Carolina executed Margie
Velma Barfield, officials rushed her body from Raleigh to nearby
Winston-Salem.54  There, doctors removed Barfield’s organs for trans-
plant, also according to her wishes.55  It is not publicly known if pa-
tients actually received Gilmore’s or Barfield’s organs, but they
appear to have gotten closer to posthumous donation than any known
inmate since.
More recent efforts to donate have been relatively common but dif-
fuse and unsuccessful.  Commentators have counted as many as four-
teen death row inmates who have pursued the possibility of
posthumous donation.56  Before his 1995 execution, Jonathan Nobles
asked Texas prison officials to use alternative lethal injection drugs to
50. Campbell v. Wainwright, 416 F.2d 949, 950 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Organs Donated, Body Cremated: Gary Gilmore Saga Over, CITIZEN OTTAWA, Jan. 18,
1977, at 1.  Doctors reported that his kidneys were unusable because of the nature of his death—
execution by firing squad. Id.
54. William E. Schmidt, First Woman Is Executed in U.S. Since 1962, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,
1984, at A6.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Lin et al., supra note 22, at 1774. R
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preserve his organs for donation.57  That same year, a Georgia death
row inmate, Larry Lonchar, attempted to postpone his death sentence
long enough for Georgia to change its method of execution from the
electric chair to a method that would allow him to donate.58  Although
the U.S. Supreme Court heard his case and stayed his execution so
that a federal court could determine the merits of his habeas corpus
petition,59 Georgia electrocuted Lonchar in November 199660 after
the court denied his petition.61  As a result, Lonchar died without do-
nating his organs.62  More recently, Ronnie Lee Gardner, who was
executed by the State of Utah in 2010, sought to donate his organs
after execution but was prohibited from doing so.63
Around the same time as Gardner, Christian Longo, the Oregon
death row inmate who became an advocate for would-be prisoner-
donors, initiated his effort to donate his organs after execution.64
Longo has not only expressed his own desire to donate, but has also
advocated for policy changes to allow inmates across the country to
donate.65  Prison officials oppose the idea, apparently on the grounds
that they do not want to leave inmates with the misimpression that
they could sell their organs for cash.66  In 2011, Oregon Governor
57. Perales, supra note 31, at 709.  The most common contemporary method of execution—a R
three-drug lethal injection protocol consisting of a sedative, a paralytic, and an agent to induce
cardiac arrest—leaves organs unusable for transplant.  Lin et al., supra note 22, at 1777. R
58. Loretta Lepore, Convicted Killer Appeals To Give Life to Others, CNN (Dec. 3, 1995,
10:58 PM), http://www.cnn.com/US/9512/death_row_donor/.
59. Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 332 (1996).
60. Rhonda Cook, Lonchar Dies in Electric Chair for ’86 Killings: Two Jolts Are Needed at
State Prison to Carry Out His Sentence for DeKalb–Triple-Murder, ATL. J.-CONST., Nov. 14,
1996, at A1.
61. See Lonchar v. Turpin, 84 F.3d 386 (1996) (mem.).
62. See Lepore, supra note 58.  In a cruel twist, Lonchar’s execution contributed to Georgia’s R
2001 abandonment of electrocution as a method of execution. See Dawson v. State, 554 S.E.2d
137, 143–44 (Ga. 2001) (holding that electrocution violated state constitution’s prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment).  During Lonchar’s execution, the warden subjected him to two
cycles of electricity after witnesses reported seeing movement in Lonchar’s chest following the
first.  Cook, supra note 60.  In oral argument before the Georgia Supreme Court, counsel for the R
appellants in Dawson cited Lonchar’s execution to demonstrate the brutality of this execution
method.  Bill Rankin, Cruel or Just Grim?  Georgia Justices Weigh Clinical Facts of Electric
Chair, ATL. J.-CONST., July 10, 2001, at A1.
63. Utah Donations from Prisoners, supra note 7. R
64. For a firsthand account of Longo’s effort, see generally A Lethal Catch-22 for Christian
Longo, G.A.V.E. (Mar. 25, 2014), https://gavelife.wordpress.com/2014/03/25/a-lethal-catch-22-
for-christian-longo/.
65. Id.; see also Finkel, supra note 2 (detailing Longo’s intentions and efforts). R
66. Mark Hanrahan, Christian Longo, Death Row Inmate, Fights For Right To Donate His
Organs After Execution, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/21/christian
-longo-death-row-organ-donation_n_852090.html (last updated June 21, 2011, 1:24 PM).  It does
not appear, however, that Longo is under this misimpression. See infra notes 127–128 and ac- R
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John Kitzhaber imposed a moratorium on the state’s death penalty,
which has largely mooted Longo’s efforts to donate after execution.67
As evidenced by this history, posthumous donation is a particular
concern for death row inmates.  While most prisoners have an expec-
tation of life beyond prison and, thus, can reasonably anticipate exer-
cising the same freedoms with respect to organ donation as other
citizens, policies blocking posthumous donation necessarily mean that
death row inmates will never have the opportunity to contribute in
this way.
C. States’ Efforts To Allow Organ Donation
Members of some state legislatures, often in response to efforts by
individual inmates to donate, have waged their own campaigns to
make organ donation possible.  Each of these efforts has come within
the last thirty years68 after the two known cases of posthumous dona-
tion by inmates.69
The most far-reaching and successful effort is a Utah law that took
effect in 2013 and allows prisoners to register to become posthumous
organ donors.70  That law, sponsored by Representative Steven
Eliason, a Republican from Sandy, does not distinguish between death
row and general population inmates and offers inmates nothing in ex-
change for registering as donors.71  News outlets described it as the
first state law explicitly permitting “general prisoners to sign up for
organ donation” and acknowledged that it “cracks the door to the
controversial option of allowing death-row inmates to donate as
well.”72  Ronnie Lee Gardner, who sought to donate his organs before
execution, served as Representative Eliason’s inspiration.73
companying text (collecting statements of inmates, including Longo, who have made it clear that
they wish to donate their organs without receiving anything in return).
67. Brandi Grissom, Considering Death Row for Organs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2012, http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/09/09/us/considering-the-ethics-of-organ-donations-from-death-row
.html.
68. In addition to those described in this Section, bills in California, Connecticut, Penn-
sylvania, and Rhode Island that would allow inmates to register to become posthumous organ
donors have been proposed but not passed. See A.B. 2440, 2009–2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2009); H.B. 6271, Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2015); H.B. 465, 2015–2016 Gen. As-
semb., Reg. Sess. (Penn. 2015); H.B. 7076, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2008).
69. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text (discussing organ harvests for transplant R
after the executions of Gary Gilmore and Margie Velma Barfield).
70. UTAH CODE § 64-13-44 (2014).
71. Utah Donations from Prisoners, supra note 7. R
72. Id.
73. Id.; see also supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing Gardner’s desire to donate R
and his ultimate execution).
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In contrast to the successful passage of Utah’s statute, legislative
proposals that have offered reduced sentences in exchange for dona-
tion have failed.  A 1998 bill introduced to the Missouri House of
Representatives by Representative Chuck Graham, a Democrat from
Columbia, proposed commuting any inmate’s death sentence in ex-
change for his donation of a kidney or bone marrow (a so-called “Life
for a Life” bill),74 an effort inspired by the efforts of Milton Griffin.75
In 2007, State Senator Ralph Anderson, a Democrat from Greenville,
introduced a bill in the South Carolina legislature.76  The proposal of-
fered a sixty-day sentence reduction to inmates “who voluntarily do-
nate[d] bone marrow or blood-forming cells.”77  During the same
legislative session, Senator Anderson also proposed a bill that would
enable the Department of Corrections to award up to 180 days of
good conduct credit for a “particularly meritorious or humanitarian
act,”78 specifically intending that organ donation could be one such
act.  Similarly, bills proposed in Kentucky and Massachusetts have
provided for “an educational good time credit of sixty (60) days to any
prisoner who . . . [b]ecomes a living organ donor.”79
Other state legislators have proposed measures to permit posthu-
mous donation by death row inmates specifically; however, none of
these proposals have become law.  Most recently, Oklahoma State
Representative Cory T. Williams, a Stillwater Democrat, sponsored a
bill that would allow death row inmates to make anatomical gifts im-
mediately prior to execution.80  In 2000, Representative William F.
Andrews, a Republican of Delray Beach, introduced a bill to the Flor-
ida House of Representatives that would change the state’s execution
74. H.B. 1670 (Mo. 1998); Jeffrey A. Lowell, News Analysis: Proposed Organ Donation by
Death Row Inmates Medically Risky, Coerced and Immoral, Expert Says, WASH. U. ST. LOUIS
REC., Apr. 9, 1998, http://digitalcommons.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1790&content=
record.
75. In 1998, Griffin, a Missouri death row inmate, offered to donate his bone marrow or a
kidney if it would spare him from execution. See Whitney Hinkle, Note, Giving Until It Hurts:
Prisoners Are Not the Answer to the National Organ Shortage, 35 IND. L. REV. 593, 609 (2002).
76. See S.B. 417, 117th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2007).
77. Id.
78. S.B. 480, 117th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2007).  Neither bill offering reduced
sentences in exchange for donation made it out of their committee, but a third bill proposed by
Senator Anderson that session—creating an educational program on organ and tissue donation
within the Department of Corrections—became law.  2007 S.C. Acts 41 (codified at S.C. CODE
ANN. § 24-1-285); see also supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing the South Carolina R
educational program).  See Emily C. Lee, Trading Kidneys for Prison Time: When Two Contra-
dictory Legal Traditions Intersect, Which One Has the Right-of-Way?, U.S.F. L. REV. 507, 507–08
(2009) for a discussion of all three of Senator Anderson’s proposals. See also supra note 29 R
(discussing like programs in Alabama, Oklahoma, and Virginia).
79. H.B. 444, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.B. 1624, 189th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2015).
80. See H.B. 2703, 54 Leg., Sd. Sess. (Okla. 2014).
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method from the electric chair to one more conducive to organ pro-
curement to enable donation by willing death row inmates.81  Simi-
larly, Georgia State Representative Doug Teper, an Atlanta
Democrat, introduced a bill to replace the electric chair with a guillo-
tine for death row inmates who wished to donate organs in the midst
of (and apparently in response to) Larry Lonchar’s efforts to donate
his organs.82  Years earlier, in 1987, Kansas State Representative
Martha Jenkins, a Leavenworth Republican, proposed a bill reintro-
ducing capital punishment to the state and allowing condemned in-
mates to donate posthumously.83
Not surprisingly, the legislative focus has largely been on the poten-
tial benefit this type of policy change would offer patients awaiting
transplantable organs.  While discussing the Utah law that he spon-
sored, Representative Eliason stated his belief that prohibiting dona-
tion after execution is “a waste of perfectly good organs.”84  Similarly,
contemporary press accounts quoted Senator Anderson, explaining
that Bill 480 was designed to address the short supply of organs availa-
ble for transplant.  He said: “I believe we have to do something to
motivate them.  If they get some good time off, if they get out early,
that’s motivation.”85  Senator Anderson indicated that the shortage of
donors in minority communities especially concerned him.86  Repre-
sentative Andrews of Florida introduced his bill by stating that if the
state could “save some body parts to extend someone’s life, [it] ought
to do it.”87  However, absent from these discussions was the potential
benefit donation offers the donors.88
81. See H.B. 999, 2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1999).
82. See H.B. 1274, 143d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1996); supra notes 58–62 and accompa- R
nying text (discussing Lonchar’s attempt at organ donation and his ultimate execution).
83. Laura-Hill M. Patton, Note, A Call for Common Sense: Organ Donation and the Executed
Prisoner, 3 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 387, 433 (1996) (discussing the Kansas proposal and stating
that the bill was passed in the Kansas House but defeated in the Kansas Senate). See generally
H.B. 2062 (Kan. 1987).
84. Utah Donations from Prisoners, supra note 7 (quoting Rep. Steve Eliason). R
85. Jenny Jarvie, Inmates Could Trade an Organ for an Early Out, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2007, at
A25 (quoting Sen. Ralph Anderson).
86. Kevin B. O’Reilly, Prisoner Organ Donation Proposal Worrisome, AM. MED. NEWS (Apr.
9, 2007), http://www.amednews.com/article/20070409/profession/304099964/6/ (reporting that a
speaker at his church, who discussed the shortage of organ donors in minority communities,
inspired Senator Anderson).
87. Jeff Testerman, Bill Seeks Transplants of Organs of Executed, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Mar. 26, 2000, http://www.sptimes.com/News/032600/State/Bill_seeks_transplant.shtml (quoting
Rep. William F. Andrews).
88. Although this discussion was absent from Representative Andrews’ bill, Representative
Eliason noted the possible positive effect on a donor-inmate when he remarked, “How disap-
pointing is that, there’s somebody who maybe wants to atone for his sins in some way [and
can’t].” Utah Donations from Prisoners, supra note 7 (quoting Rep. Steve Eliason).  See infra
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D. Existing Arguments in Favor of Donation
Scholars and others who advocate for donation often do so by fo-
cusing on the benefit to the potential donees.  They argue that permit-
ting donation by inmates, whether posthumous or living, death row or
otherwise, would increase the availability of organs for transplant and
point to the fact that, in 201189 more than 3,000 inmates died in state
prisons generally90 and forty-three more were executed.91  Because a
healthy corpse can offer as many as fifty donation opportunities, some
of which would be lifesaving, these deaths represent the possibility of
thousands of lives saved or improved annually.92
Critics of this approach, however, stress that allowing inmates to
donate their organs is unlikely to have a dramatic impact on the ag-
gregate supply of available organs.  Executions have grown increas-
ingly rare, and the practical realities of prison life (and death) make
donation difficult.  Inmates are more likely than the general popula-
tion to suffer from diseases like HIV that make donation impossible.93
One estimate suggests that roughly one-half of prisoners would be eli-
gible donors, with the others disqualified due to age, infirmity, or dis-
ease.94  Current methods of execution would likely render few organs
from death row inmates viable for donation.95  Moreover, prisons are
often geographically isolated, and the resulting time gap between
death and transport to a medical facility capable of harvesting organs
Part IV, for a more thorough discussion of the relationship between organ donations and peno-
logical purposes.
89. This is the most recent year for which data is available. NOONAN & GINDER, supra note 5, R
at 19 tbl.14.
90. Id.
91. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2012: YEAR END REPORT 1 (Dec.
2012), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2012YearEnd.pdf (including figures for
2011).
92. Danielle M. Wagner, Comment, Property Rights in the Human Body: The Commercializa-
tion of Organ Transplantation and Biotechnology, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 931, 943 n.109 (1995).  It
should be noted that Wagner derives this figure from a 1991 Washington Post article. Id.  (citing
Re-usable Body Parts, WASH. POST, May 28, 1991).  Given the advances in medical technology,
the figure has likely risen over the last two decades.  As of December 2014, more than 120,000
people were waiting for organs. The Gap Continues to Widen, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., http://www.organdonor.gov/about/graphdescription.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).
93. Arthur Caplan, The Use of Prisoners as Sources of Organs—An Ethically Dubious Prac-
tice, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Oct. 2011, at 2. But see Mark Joseph Stern, HIV-Positive People Can
Soon Donate Organs. Great News, SLATE (Nov. 22, 2013, 11:37 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/
outward/2013/11/22/hiv_positive_organ_donation_hope_act_signed_into_law.html (reporting on
the enactment of the HIV Organ Policy Equity Act, which lifted a ban on research of organ
transplants between HIV positive people).
94. Lin et al., supra note 22, at 1777. R
95. Caplan, supra note 93, at 2–3. R
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-4\DPL402.txt unknown Seq: 16 11-OCT-16 7:37
1208 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1193
would leave many organs unsuitable for transplant.96  As a result, the
estimated net increase in donors if death row inmates were allowed to
donate is less than one-fifth of 1%,97 and the figure seems unlikely to
rise markedly if the pool of donors expands to include those dying
from causes other than execution.98
Thoracic surgeon Shu S. Lin and nurse Lauren Rich make a slightly
different argument, appealing to the benefit donation would offer in-
dividual patients suffering from end-stage organ failure rather than
the potential for an aggregate increase in the organ supply.99  They
assert that “[p]ursuing every opportunity for organ donation is not
merely an attempt to ‘close the ever-widening gap between demand
and supply of organs’” but, rather, an appropriate means of helping
individual patients.100  The lifesaving benefit of donation to a single
patient suffering from end-stage organ disease is immeasurable.  Thus,
the life options for the specific organ recipients would be greatly aug-
mented, even if the overall organ supply were not.
The history and scholarship focused on the practicalities of organ
donation by inmates does little to resolve the debate in this area.
III. PHILOSOPHICAL OBJECTIONS TO POSTHUMOUS
DONATION BY PRISONERS
Unlike the primary arguments in favor of allowing inmates to do-
nate their organs posthumously, which focus on the benefits to the
donees, objections to donation generally focus on the donors—the in-
mates.101  Most critics cite fears about coercion as a reason to prohibit
cadaveric donation.  These objections employ an overbroad definition
of coercion, however, and often arise from speculative and paternalis-
tic assumptions about inmates.  Other objections seem motivated by
an irrational revulsion at the thought of sharing body materials with a
criminal, but this stigmatization is an inappropriate basis on which to
legislate.  Fears about the impact inmate organ donation will have on
96. Lin et al., supra note 22, at 1777. R
97. Id.
98. See NOONAN & GINDER, supra note 5, at 19 (showing that the leading cause of death in R
prison is disease, accounting for 2,867 of 3,232 state prison deaths in 2010).
99. Lin et al., supra note 22, at 1773–75 (arguing that there is no medical, ethical, or logical R
reason to prohibit death row organ donation in light of the potential benefit for those suffering
from end-stage organ failure).
100. See id. at 1773 (quoting Caplan, supra note 93, at 1). R
101. This Part focuses on the philosophical objections to posthumous donation.  Other au-
thors have dealt with the practical difficulties imprisonment poses for effective donation.  See
supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text, for a discussion of these issues. R
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sentencing, especially as it relates to capital punishment, however,
seem appropriate but resolvable.
A. Coercion-Based Objections
Fears of coercion underlie many of the objections to allowing in-
mates to donate organs.  The UNOS Ethics Committee lists coercion
as one of the top ethical concerns that must be resolved prior to al-
lowing donation by death row inmates,102 and commentators, such as
Caplan and Pal, find it an insurmountable obstacle to overcome.103
Moreover, state officials worry that inmates will choose to donate
under the misperception that doing so will provide them with
favorable treatment, making participation less than voluntary.104
1. Allowing Donation Is Not Coercive in Any Meaningful Sense
In the narrowest sense of the term, coercion involves threat of an
unfavorable change in circumstances that compels an individual to
make one choice to avoid that unfavorable change.  Alternatively, co-
ercion may be part of an offer to improve circumstances so dramati-
cally that the individual accepts the offer, even if she would not make
the same choice under different circumstances.105  In this sense, coer-
cion exists when one cannot make or act on decisions free from the
intervention of another’s will.106  Living donation in exchange for a
reduced sentence, which has been proposed by several state legisla-
102. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing the Committee’s opposition). R
103. See supra notes 120–29 and accompanying text (discussing Caplan’s and Pal’s
opposition).
104. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text (discussing prison officers’ fear that in- R
mates will misinterpret organ donation as selling organs for cash).
105. See Jefferson-Jones, supra note 25, at 133 (“Traditionally, coercion involves the threat R
that an unfavorable change in circumstances will occur if the coercee does not take the action
desired by the coercer.”).  Though Jefferson-Jones would not categorize an offer too good to
refuse as coercion because it is a conditional offer rather than a conditional threat, it seems that
a conditional offer changing the circumstances of those who accept so favorably—from incarcer-
ation to freedom, for example—erases any meaningful distinction between a threat and an offer.
This militates in favor of including an offer too good to refuse, such that it intervenes on one’s
will, as coercive. Cf. Sally Satel, Opinion, Let Prisoners Donate Their Organs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
25, 2013, www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/04/25/should-prisoners-be-allowed-to-donate-
their-organs/let-prisoners-donate-their-organs (asserting that decision-making remains voluntary
when one is not subject to an “offer that is ‘too good to refuse’”).
106. Erica J. Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendant’s Right to Control
the Case, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1147, 1153 (2010) (defining autonomy as the ability to act freely with-
out government intervention); see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 875, 889 (1994) (“‘[C]oercion’ connotes the deliberate and wrongful subjecting of one
human being to the will of another or domination that disrespects the other’s equal moral
worth.”).
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tures,107 or other reprieve from punishment, which occurred in the
case of the Scotts,108 risks coercion in this sense, as would posthumous
donation in exchange for better treatment while in prison.  Purely vol-
untary, nonincentivized cadaveric donation by inmates, however, does
not implicate concerns about coercion under this narrower definition.
Indeed, in this narrow and meaningful sense, prohibiting donation is
coercive in that it prevents inmates from exercising their free will.
However, some scholars worry about a broader conception of coer-
cion in which the nature of the prison environment necessarily re-
stricts prisoners’ autonomy and inhibits their ability to make free
choices.  The Berne Declaration and Greenpeace voiced this concern
in 2010 when they awarded the “Public Eye Award” to Roche, a mul-
tinational pharmaceutical company, for its irresponsibility in using or-
gans from executed Chinese prisoners in its clinical trials.109  The
organizations noted:  “Even when a prisoner supposedly consents to
an organ donation, such consent, while imprisoned cannot be consid-
ered of one’s own free will.”110  Professor Lawrence O. Gostin echoed
this critique when he argued:  “Free consent is not truly possible
under [the] coercive conditions” of prison life, where inmates’ keepers
determine every aspect of their lives and inmates “will do almost any-
thing to make their lives better.”111  Under this definition of coercion,
inmates are vulnerable and unable to make truly voluntary choices
because the restrictions on liberty concomitant with incarceration pre-
vent them from making voluntary and informed choices.112
Concerns about coercion are rooted in the fear that some outside
force may operate on the prisoner to deprive him of his free will, but
denying willing prisoners the opportunity to donate imposes an even
107. See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text, for examples of this type of proposed R
legislation. See also Hinkle, supra note 75, at 610–15 (objecting to living organ donations in R
exchange for a reduced sentence because the nature of the prison environment and the promise
of liberty prevent informed consent); Visconti, supra note 41, at 215–16 (opposing release condi- R
tioned on living organ donations, as in the Scotts’ case because it violates NOTA’s prohibition on
exchanging organs for something of value).
108. See supra notes 42–47 and accompanying text (discussing the Scott sisters’ case and its R
aftermath).
109. Judith Schrempf-Stirling, Roche’s Clinical Trials with Organs from Prisoners: Does Profit
Trump Morals?, 121 J. BUS. ETHICS 315, 315 (2014).
110. Id.; see also Adnan Sharif et al., Organ Procurement from Executed Prisoners in China,
14 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2246, 2247 (2014) (“[I]ncarcerated inmates condemned to death
are not in the position to make an autonomous and informed consent for organ donation.”).
111. Lawrence O. Gostin, Opinion, Prisoners Shouldn’t Be Allowed To Donate Their Organs,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/04/25/should-prisoners-
be-allowed-to-donate-their-organs/prisoners-shouldnt-be-allowed-to-donate-their-organs.
112. See Caplan, supra note 93, at 4; Gostin, supra note 111; Lin et al., supra note 22, at 1776. R
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more direct restraint on prisoners’ autonomy.113  Speaking of the ex-
change implicit in Missouri’s unsuccessful “Life for a Life” propo-
sal,114 one commentator observed: “Prisoners, like all other
individuals, must have control over whether to donate their or-
gans.”115  That assertion applies with equal force to those who wish to
donate as to those who do not, and it fails to appreciate that inmates
who wish to donate currently have no such control.
Prohibiting donation based on this second conception of coercion is
overbroad and, by some measures, is its own form of coercion.  The
prevailing prohibition on posthumous donation by inmates deprives
those who wish to donate of autonomy and agency even more directly
than would purporting to give inmates choice but exerting pressure
because of the terms of the exchange.116  In short, it “coerces” in the
more direct sense:  It prevents the exercise of the will of inmates who,
given the option, would freely choose to donate.
Accordingly, coercion in its second sense is not truly “coercion” as
much as it is a denial of agency.  Coercion certainly denies agency, but
for it to be distinguishable from incarceration and other restrictions
on agency, coercion must be something more than reduced choices.
Moreover, if we accept this broader definition of coercion, it might
exist for donors outside of the prison context, especially in cases of
living donation,117 yet the same outcry for the prohibition of living
donation does not exist.  Limiting agency under the rubric of coercion
is appropriate only when one is being compelled to make a choice she
would not make under different circumstances.
Defining coercion more narrowly does not ignore the possibility it is
real.  Restriction of inmates’ liberty defines incarceration, and the nat-
ural desire to be free from those restrictions invites the possibility of
113. Lin et al., supra note 22, at 1775 (“It is hypocritical to argue that organ donation by death R
row inmates is morally wrong because the prisoners’ autonomy is undermined by a subtle form
of coercion, because denying the prisoners’ requests to donate is an even greater compromise of
their autonomy.”)
114. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the proposed R
legislation.
115. Hinkle, supra note 75, at 614 (concerning living organ donations by inmates). R
116. This is true even though jurisdictions employ these practices while prohibiting posthu-
mous donation. See generally supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text (discussing blood credit- R
ing programs); supra notes 40–47 and accompanying text (detailing the case of the Scott sisters). R
117. Hinkle, supra note 75, at 612 (discussing the pressure that family and physicians may R
exert when a relative is a suitable living donor for a family member); Shannon Ross, Opinion,
With Organ Donations, Let Prisoners Give Life to Others, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2013, http://
www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/04/25/should-prisoners-be-allowed-to-donate-their-or
gans/with-organ-donations-let-prisoners-give-life-to-others (“As for coercion, whether it’s an
overwhelming conscience, a yearning to make amends or the impending death of a loved one,
virtually all donation is coerced.”).
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enticing inmates with explicit or implicit exchanges on their liberty.
Understanding that inmates are an especially vulnerable population,
we afford prisoners special protection in other contexts, like medical
research.  For example, the National Institute of Health acknowledges
that incarceration could affect prisoners’ abilities “to make a truly vol-
untary and uncoerced decision whether or not to participate as sub-
jects in research” and, accordingly, has established additional
safeguards to protect them.118  The sort of posthumous donation for
which this Article advocates would not countenance coercion, and ed-
ucating both prisoners and prison officials to ensure that no change in
the conditions of an inmate’s confinement occur can likely mitigate
the possibility of the less direct, more implicit form of coercion.119
2. Coercion Objections Rest on Speculative Assumptions
Concerns about coercion, whether in its broader or narrower sense,
often seem to be grounded in the supposition that inmates would not
make the decision to donate absent their incarceration.  Moreover, at
times these concerns assume that inmates are incapable of under-
standing that the donation is a gift, not an exchange for more
favorable treatment.
For example, thoracic surgeon Jay D. Pal has opposed donation by
inmates, arguing that legal, ethical, and logistical problems counsel
against allowing donation.120  Dr. Pal correctly observes that prisoners
“are subject to physically and psychologically stressful conditions that
undoubtedly affect the decisions they make.”121  But he then argues
that, even in the absence of “any explicit promise of reward for dona-
tion, . . . prisoners may ‘understand themselves to be making an im-
118. 45 C.F.R. § 46.302 (2015).
119. Identifying a precondition that would mitigate concerns surrounding coercion and pos-
thumous donation, bioethicist Ruth Faden wrote that “the quality of medical care for prisoners
who wish to be posthumous organ donors should not be permitted to deviate from standard
medical practice for organ procurement[,]” a standard that should apply even if posthumous
donor is not incarcerated.  Ruth Faden, Opinion, The Utah Law Allowing Prisoners To Donate
Organs Is Fine, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2013, www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/04/25/should-
prisoners-be-allowed-to-donate-their-organs/the-utah-law-allowing-prisoners-to-donate-organs-
is-fine.  In fact, to ensure that a donation is not coerced in the more direct sense, prison officials
should take care to treat prisoners who have agreed to serve as donors no differently than other
inmates, not just in their medical treatment, but in every aspect of their incarceration.
120. Lin et al., supra note 22, at 1776–77.  Dr. Pal was writing specifically about death row R
inmates, but his arguments seem to apply with equal force to inmates who die in prison under
other circumstances.
121. Lin et al., supra note 22, at 1776. R
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plicit exchange for their generosity.’”122  Professor Lawrence Gostin
expresses a similar concern when he worries that “[d]espite rules that
organ donations should not affect prisoner conditions, [prisoners] will
believe otherwise.”123  Gostin fears that, because death row inmates
are at higher risk of exploitation than prisoners generally, they will
feel even more pressure to donate if they misunderstand the terms of
their donations.124
These objections rest on factual premises that are at best specula-
tive and at worst false.  There is little basis for the belief that no in-
mate would elect to donate on his own, free from the inherent
restrictions of incarceration.125  The widespread, and largely diffuse,
efforts of inmates to donate over the last thirty-plus years under vary-
ing circumstances undermine the notion that no inmate would will-
ingly donate.126  Moreover, there is no reason to believe that prior to
or after imprisonment these individuals volunteer to be organ donors
at different rates than adults with similar demographics but who are
not imprisoned.
Further, a number of inmates who have expressed willingness to
donate have done so with the explicit understanding that the donation
would not affect the conditions of their incarceration.  Shannon Ross,
a Wisconsin inmate who has advocated for allowing inmates to donate
both alive and posthumously, points out that “[a]s long as those of us
incarcerated are clearly informed that we will receive no compensa-
tion for donating, which is completely doable, allowing us to donate is
no less ethical than the current system.”127  Likewise, Christian Longo
has expressed his “personal belief that such donations should be made
altruistically.”128  And to the extent that inmates might agree to do-
nate under this misimpression, it seems easy to dispel through the
same sort of donor education and consent-seeking employed outside
prison walls.  Appropriate models for ensuring that inmates’ consent
122. Id. (quoting Stuart J. Younger et al., Ethical, Psychological, and Public Policy Implica-
tions of Procuring Organs From Non-Heart-Beating Cadaver Donors, 269 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
2769 (1993)).
123. Gostin, supra note 111. R
124. Id.
125. At the very least, this would support a freeze-frame model of posthumous donation, in
which inmates who expressed their desire to be posthumous organ donors (by means recognized
by UAGA) prior to their incarceration should be permitted to donate posthumously should they
die during incarceration.
126. See generally discussion supra Sections II.B.2–3 (detailing the efforts of inmates to serve
as organ donors, posthumous and living).
127. Ross, supra note 117. R
128. LONGO, supra note 1, at 9.
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to serve as posthumous donors would be willing and informed exist in
other contexts as well.129
3. Coercion Objections Regard Inmates Paternalistically
The absolutist view that prisoners cannot, or will not, consent to
donation absent the pressures associated with confinement undergirds
coercion-based objections.  That view takes the paternalistic position
that society must protect inmates from themselves.130  After all, the
argument that the prison environment itself compels an inmate to do-
nate only survives scrutiny if the inmate would not freely elect to do-
nate were he not imprisoned and subject to that environment.  But it
is likely that the same things that motivate individuals to become or-
gan donors outside of prison motivate those inside.  As a class, there
seems to be little reason inmates would need more protection from
their desire to become cadaveric donors than would other vulnerable
populations, like minors who signal their consent to donate on their
applications for learner’s permits and driver’s licenses.
Moreover, living donation and blood crediting, which jurisdictions
around the country more commonly permit, raise greater concerns
about agency and the possibility of coercion given the often unambig-
uous benefits received by prisoners who consent to these transac-
tions.131  Recall, for example, the case of Gladys and Jamie Scott.
Although the sisters proposed the donation that led to their early re-
lease,132 Governor Haley Barbour granted their petition on the ex-
press condition that Gladys donate her kidney to Jamie.  By reducing
their sentences and granting them immediate release conditioned on
donation, the state turned a donative transplant into a transaction for
consideration.  This imposes a much more explicitly coercive condi-
tion than does donation that offers no reprieve from incarceration,
129. For example, physician-assisted suicide, or so-called death with dignity laws, might pro-
vide an appropriate model. See, e.g., Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 127.800–.995 (2009) (requiring a written request, waiting period, and safeguards for physi-
cians to follow to ensure that consent is informed).  It would also be appropriate to make the
opportunity available only for inmates “who initiate discussions of organ donation on their
own.”  Patton, supra note 83, at 402.  These (and other) practical concerns regarding how to R
implement a system of posthumous donation are beyond the scope of this Article.
130. Sally Satel brushes against this point when she asks: “What evidence supports the claim
that prison itself distorts all inmates’ mental capacity to sort through the pros and cons of dona-
tion?”  Satel, supra note 105 (arguing also that the view that prisoners cannot, as a class, volunta- R
rily consent to donation “does not do justice to this nuanced issue”).
131. See generally discussion supra Sections II.A.3, II.B.1 (collecting jurisdictions that permit
living organ donation, and blood crediting, respectively).
132. But see Goldberg & Frader, supra note 41, at 15 (arguing that the sisters were released R
for reasons other than the offer to effect a kidney transfer).
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because Gladys faces the threat of reincarceration if she fails to do-
nate.133  Moreover, Jamie presumably faces the same threat if she fails
to lose enough weight to make her a suitable transplant recipient.  At
the very least, the sisters have been barred from entering Mississippi
with little explanation.134
That we have countenanced living organ donations under these cir-
cumstances and continue to allow blood crediting programs belies
concerns about coercion in the posthumous donation setting.  After
all, the same opportunities for reprieve (in the event of donation), and
reincarceration or restrictions on interstate travel (if no donation
takes place), do not exist in the posthumous donation setting.
B. Stigma-Based Objections
Coercion and impracticability are not the only concerns raised with
respect to posthumous donation.  Other objections seem to be
founded in a pervasive stigma directed at prisoners.  Although propo-
nents of organ donation by inmates often point to evidence that po-
tential organ recipients would not refuse an organ from an inmate
donor135 or to evidence of public support for organ donation by in-
mates,136 it is unlikely that proponents would feel the need to study
and respond to these concerns if they were not actually lingering in
the background.  Thus, these affirmations are non sequiturs unless
there is an expectation that patients would be unwilling to accept or-
gans from prisoners or that public disapproval for this practice exists.
Instead, it appears that they are responding to unspoken concerns that
133. Id. at 15 (“Although Barbour can technically order Gladys back to prison if she fails to
donate within a year of her release, his office has remained quiet on whether he would exercise
that power.”).
134. Gates, supra note 47. R
135. See, e.g., Mark Curriden, Inmate’s Last Wish Is To Donate Kidney, A.B.A. J., June 1996,
at 26, 26 (reporting that Melvin Ferguson, the assistant police chief who investigated the murders
committed by Larry Lonchar and who was suffering from kidney failure, was willing to accept a
kidney from Lonchar, despite his intimate familiarity with Lonchar’s crimes); Lin et al., supra
note 22, at 1775 (collecting responses from sixteen patients on the Duke Lung Transplant Pro-
gram’s active waiting list and noting that twelve patients responded that they would be willing to
accept lungs from a death row inmate, and one responded that she would have responded “‘yes’
in case of greater recipient instability”); Satel, supra note 105 (writing that she would accept an
organ from a prisoner).
136. See, e.g., Lin et al., supra note 22, at 1775 (citing Should Death Row Inmates Be Allowed R
To Donate Their Organs?, NBC NEWS, HEALTH (Apr. 20, 2011), http://health.newsvine.com/_
question/2011/04/20/6504300-should-death-row-inmates-be-allowed-to-donate-their-organs;
Should Man Who Killed Wife and Two Children Be Allowed To Donate His Organs?, SODA
HEAD (Apr. 24, 2011), http://www.sodahead.com/united-states/should-man-who-killed-wife-and-
two-children-be-allowed-to-donate-his-organs/question-1707899/ [hereinafter Opinion Polls] (re-
counting results from three opinion polls providing “overwhelming support for the idea that
condemned prisoners should be allowed donate their organs for transplantation”).
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the criminality that landed the donor in prison might taint the organ
transferee or result in a psychological rejection even if the transplant
were a medical success.
Economist Alvin E. Roth examined the role of repugnance in regu-
lating transactions, and argues that distaste for certain activities con-
strains those practices as much as technological constraints or the
more traditional economic explanations of efficiency and incen-
tives.137  Critics then only obliquely refer to these concerns because of
their underlying anti-intellectualism, relying on emotion rather than
logic.138  Once understood in this way, it becomes clear that repug-
nance rooted in stigmatization is not a philosophically or ethically
sound basis for prohibiting organ donations by inmates.
These same stigma-driven objections do not appear to apply with
equal force to living donations from inmates, which are, in greater
measure, permitted.  But living donation by inmates is mostly permit-
ted with respect to blood materials, which are highly fungible products
that physicians and patients accept as often coming from society’s un-
derbelly.139  To a lesser extent, inmate organ donation is allowed with
respect to living donations to family members, when the existing rela-
tionship between the donor and donee might be expected to mitigate
the idea that accepting the organ would pollute the donee’s body.
This generally unvoiced, gut-level reaction to the idea of incorporat-
ing a criminal’s body materials into one’s own body might be a reason
that a patient would choose to reject an available organ and, instead,
wait for the next one to become available.  But this is no reason to bar
prisoners from donating.  Instead, potential donees could be told from
where the available organ came, and they would be free to proceed
with the transplant or pass the organ to the next suitable donee.  Thus,
this concern should affect, at most, the eventual order in which wait-
listed patients receive organs and not whether prisoners should be
permitted to be donors in the first instance.
C. Objections Based on the Application of the Death Penalty
Amidst these largely misplaced objections, there is a wholly legiti-
mate one.  The desire to avoid introducing issues of organ supply into
the already fraught application of the death penalty is likely the least
137. Alvin E. Roth, Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Summer
2007, at 37, 38.
138. See Jefferson-Jones, supra note 25, at 107. R
139. See generally KARA W. SWANSON, BANKING ON THE BODY: THE MARKET IN BLOOD,
MILK, AND SPERM IN MODERN AMERICA 1–14 (2014) (discussing the history of professional
blood donors).
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addressable concern surrounding posthumous donation, at least as it
pertains to death row inmates.140  Introducing the supply of trans-
plantable organs as a factor in the debate about the death penalty
could further arguments by those who advocate for wider and more
frequent application of the death penalty.  It could also lead judges
and juries to apply the death penalty with greater frequency141 or to
adjusting the timing of executions for more convenient transplant
scheduling.142  These—rather than concerns about coercion or jeop-
ardizing punishment’s aims—are the most compelling reasons to con-
sider thoughtfully the wisdom of allowing inmates to donate
posthumously.
Yet it seems highly unlikely that this possible harm would occur.
Few cases provide the possibility of the death penalty, and the
probability is low that a particular defendant in one of those cases
would opt to become an organ donor and would, in fact, die under
circumstances that make donation feasible.  Education on this point
and protections ensuring that the inmate-donor is knowingly and
freely choosing to donate are better harm preventatives than the cur-
rent ban on inmate organ donation.  Moreover, any increase in the
frequency with which the death penalty is applied that may be associ-
ated with a change in donation policy should trigger an investigation
into whether the possibility of posthumous organ donation was a fac-
tor in the sentencing long before the execution occurs.  Simply being a
factor in the debate, with no evidence that it actually affects the out-
come in any case, is insufficient to overcome the very real benefits
donation would provide.
Upon closer scrutiny, the primary objections to allowing inmates to
donate their organs posthumously prove thin, speculative, and based
more on emotion than logic.  Even when concern is warranted, as it is
with respect to the impact of a posthumous donation option on the
application of the death penalty, the actual effect is unknown.  Thus,
an appropriate approach would be regulation and vigilance, not
prohibition.
140. Amy L. Friedman, Opinion, We Must Draw the Line on Organ Donations by Death-Row
Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/04/25/should-
prisoners-be-allowed-to-donate-their-organs/draw-the-line-on-organ-donations-by-death-row-
inmates.
141. See Grissom, supra note 67 (“Would a donation affect jurors in murder cases who are R
weighing the death penalty versus life sentences?  Or prosecutors deciding whether to seek the
death penalty?  Or governors deciding whether to grant clemency?”).
142. Critics allege this sort of manipulation occurs in China. See, e.g., Sharif et al., supra note
110, at 2248. R
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IV. POSTHUMOUS ORGAN DONATION AND THE
PURPOSES OF PUNISHMENT
The philosophical objections to allowing posthumous organ dona-
tion by prisoners largely focus on the impact on individuals, including:
(1) whether prisoners can freely decide to donate; (2) whether pa-
tients will benefit from this type of donation; and (3) the impact on
defendants accused of capital offenses.  However, there is also a po-
tential societal objection to donation.  If allowing donation by inmates
undermines the purposes of punishment itself, then there is cause to
believe that the costs of allowing this choice outweigh the benefits
and, thus, tilt the scales toward prohibition.143  This Part discusses the
goals of deterrence and retribution;144 Part V discusses organ dona-
tion’s role in rehabilitation.
A. Posthumous Organ Donation and Deterrence
Deterrence as a justification for punishment relies on the premise
that “would-be offenders balance the benefits and costs of crime.”145
Punishment, then, increases the costs of crime.  Thus, it prevents crime
when the severity, certainty, and immediacy of punishment push the
cost of crime above its benefit.146
Theorists generally refer to three related theories of deterrence.
First, the general deterrence or general prevention theory provides
that punishment of an offender deters others from committing future
crimes for fear of enduring the same punishment.147  Second, the spe-
cial or particular deterrence theory posits that punishment should de-
ter a specific criminal by subjecting him to an experience he wishes
not to repeat.148  Third, the incapacitation theory focuses on the physi-
cal confinement of incarceration, which prevents the particular impris-
143. Arthur Caplan, for example, argues that organ donation is incompatible with retributive
and deterrent aims of punishment and that states should prohibit donation on that basis. See
Caplan, supra note 93, at 2–3. R
144. See generally 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1997 (2006) (describing the purposes of
punishment).
145. Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 199, 205
(2013).
146. Id. at 206.
147. See generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL
LAW § 1.5, at 33 (2d ed. 2003) (defining the deterrence rationale).
148. See Nagin, supra note 145, at 200 (“Specific deterrence concerns the aftermath of the R
failure of general deterrence—the effect on reoffending, if any, that results from the experience
of actually being punished.”). See generally 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 147, § 1.5, at 31 R
(defining particular deterrence).
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oned individual from committing further crimes.149  Incapacitation
differs from specific deterrence because the offender experiences its
effects during, rather than after, punishment, and both differ from
general deterrence in that they act on the individual who is the subject
of the punishment rather than the public at large.150
Allowing posthumous organ donation does not detract from punish-
ment’s deterrent effect under any of the three theories because the
same punishment is actualized regardless of whether donation ever
takes place.  It does not compromise punishment’s general deterrent
aims because the punishment communicates the same threat to the
public at large, irrespective of the donation: “[I]f you do these acts,
you will be subject to punishment.”151  The donation is an unrelated
activity that neither exacerbates nor mitigates the sentence.  For the
same reason, posthumous donation does not undermine punishment’s
specific deterrent effects.  In fact, the practical realities of posthumous
donation by inmates obviates any specific deterrent effect punishment
may have: Because posthumous donation only touches inmates who
die behind prison walls, there is no opportunity for punishment to
elicit a behavioral response from those inmates after its completion.152
Lastly, to the extent punishment deters other crimes through incapaci-
tation, the period of incarceration endured by inmates who might
posthumously donate has the same incapacitating effect regardless of
whether donation is allowed.
As long as punishment is carried out—and it would be in the event
of posthumous donation—allowing donation by an inmate does not
undermine incarceration’s deterrent aim.  Ethicist Molly Gardner
drives this point home when she points out that it is difficult “to imag-
ine the combination of malicious, prudential, and either altruistic or
praise-seeking motives that would cause a would-be killer to be de-
149. See generally 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 147, § 1.5, at 32 (defining the restraint R
rationale).
150. Nagin, supra note 145, at 200 (characterizing specific and general deterrence, unlike inca- R
pacitation, as a “behavioral response” to punishment).
151. Zachary Hoskins, Deterrent Punishment and Respect for Persons, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
369, 372 (2011).
152. For this reason, one might say that posthumous donation is completely irrelevant to pun-
ishment’s specific deterrent aims.  This might be true in the case of inmates who donate after
execution, because execution grants inmates little opportunity to respond to their punishment.
But, in the case of those for whom death behind prison walls is not a certainty, punishment may
still have some (unrealized) specific deterrent effect that permitting posthumous donation does
not compromise.
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terred by the prospect of execution but not by the prospect of execu-
tion combined with organ donation.”153
This brings posthumous donation into contrast with systems for liv-
ing donation, like blood credit programs, in which inmates who agree
to donate receive a reduced sentence.154  Those systems do undermine
punishment’s deterrent effect.  Punishment only specifically deters fu-
ture crime to the extent an individual cannot reduce that punishment
through later voluntary acts, like donation.  In the case of the current
programs allowing for sentence reduction by living donation, potential
criminals can discount the severity of punishment commensurate with
the amount of time by which their sentences may be reduced.  Simi-
larly, the possibility of donation in the event of conviction com-
promises punishment’s general deterrent effect, because others might
anticipate living donation as a proverbial “get-out-of-jail-free” card.
Mississippi’s early release of Gladys and Jamie Scott on the condi-
tion that Gladys donate her kidney to Jamie also evidences this dimin-
ished deterrent effect.155  And it perhaps explains why efforts, like
those of Milton Griffin, to use donation as a means of avoiding execu-
tion failed156—and should fail.  To the extent offenders view the possi-
bility of punishment as a cost of committing crime, reducing sentences
for donors mitigates crime’s negative repercussions because donation
itself is not perceived as a form of punishment.  It reduces both the
severity and the certainty of punishment by giving healthy offenders
with suitable organs a reprieve.  No such diminishment occurs when
the government carries out capital punishment (and its horror is in no
way mitigated), or when a prisoner who has elected to donate posthu-
mously serves his sentence or dies naturally while still imprisoned.
B. Posthumous Organ Donation and Retribution
Retribution as an aim of punishment rests on the notion that “when
a person commits a crime society is justified in expressing its condem-
nation of the act.”157  Under this theory, an offense merits punishment
153. Molly Gardner, Retribution, Deterrence, and Organ Donation, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Oct.
2011, at 7, 9.
154. See generally supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text (describing blood credit pro- R
grams and listing the states that use them); supra notes 64–79 and accompanying text (discussing
legislative efforts in Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, and South Carolina that, if successful,
would have allowed inmates to receive a reduced sentence in exchange for organ donations).
155. See generally supra notes 42–47 and accompanying text (detailing the Scott sisters’ saga). R
156. See Hinkle, supra note 75, at 609 (recounting the efforts of Griffin, a Missouri death row R
inmate, to make a living donation in exchange for being spared execution); Lowell, supra note
74, at 7 (describing the unsuccessful “Life for a Life” proposal Griffin inspired in the Missouri
legislature).
157. Anderson, supra note 25, at 964. R
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irrespective of whether punishment has utilitarian effects like prevent-
ing future crime.  Instead, punishment makes concrete the prisoner’s
responsibility for the harm caused.158  Allowing donation is consistent
with retributive principles because it appreciates the inmate as human,
capable of good as well as evil.159  In that sense, retribution revolves
around the axis of human agency, and denying willing prisoners the
opportunity to donate denies them that agency.160
This theory is in accord with the Kantian categorical imperative that
one must not treat another as a means to an end.161  According to
Immanuel Kant, people have intrinsic worth regardless of whether
they are ever useful to others.162  Therefore, failing “to grant them the
pursuit of their own (rational) projects and ends is to reduce them to
something less than fully human.”163  Applying this principle to organ
donation by prison inmates, ethicist Nancy Nyquist Potter argues that
allowing prisoners to make living organ donations in return for sen-
tence reductions is contrary to Kantian ethics because it appeals to
prisoners’ desire for reprieve from punishment and, in so doing, exerts
a coercive influence on prisoners’ free will.164  But in the case of pos-
thumous donation, in which prisoners stand to gain nothing except an
effectuation of their desire to become donors, the same logic does not
apply.  Instead, posthumous donation achieves the Kantian aim of
granting donors agency and the ability to pursue rational desires.
These principles are even clearer upon a closer examination of
bioethicist Arthur Caplan’s argument that because donation has the
capacity to redeem, it is inconsistent with retribution as the moral ba-
158. See Gardner, supra note 153, at 8 (describing retribution as a “nonconsequentialist” justi- R
fication for punishment).
159. Cf. L. Syd M. Johnson, The Ethically Dubious Practice of Thwarting the Redemption of
the Condemned, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Oct. 2011, at 9, 10 (“Punishment motivated and justified by
retributivism treats the criminal as a person, one who is responsible for [her] own actions, who
has earned [her] punishment by voluntarily committing a crime, and who deserves to be pun-
ished, with the proper punishment determined by the crime.”).
160. See infra Part IV, for a more thorough discussion of donation as it relates to inmate
autonomy and agency.
161. See Nancy Nyquist Potter, What It Means To Treat People as Ends-in-Themselves, AM. J.
BIOETHICS, Oct. 2011, at 6, 6.
162. Id. (citing IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (James W.
Ellington trans., 3d ed. 1993)).
163. Id. (citing KANT, supra note 162). R
164. Id.  Potter’s argument rests on an assumption about prisoner psychology; she assumes
“that prison makes it difficult for inmates to do anything for its own sake, because options are so
limited and coercion so ever-present that prisoners’ reasoning is reduced to a calculative, game-
theoretic form.” Id.  This Article questions that assumption. See infra notes 186–93, 215–20, R
223–27, and accompanying text (arguing that there are rational reasons for prisoners to chose to R
become donors).
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sis of punishment.165  Caplan reasons that donation’s creation of an
opportunity to laud donors and celebrate their altruism undermines
the retributive effect of punishment.166  The notion that potential re-
demption undermines punishment’s retributive effect cannot with-
stand scrutiny.
First, and most importantly, if punishment achieves retribution at
all, it does so regardless of whether the wrongdoer achieves redemp-
tion.167  Retribution expresses the belief that “wrongdoers should be
punished, not in spite of their value as persons, but because of it.”168
Thus, whatever capacity organ donation might have to redeem or oth-
erwise increase a person’s moral value is wholly unrelated to the re-
tributive justification for punishment.
Second, the idea that permitting donation obstructs the retributive
aim of punishment confuses retribution and revenge.169  Writing about
death row donation, Caplan fears that “[r]etribution may be made far
more difficult to achieve as families and friends of victims watch as
executed perpetrators are lauded in their final days by possible recipi-
ents and the media for their altruism in saving lives.”170  Emotion
drives revenge, but those emotional responses have no place in retri-
bution, which is the exclusive province of the state.171
Specifically, a family’s emotional reaction to execution bears no re-
lationship to whether retribution is achieved because retribution is a
nonconsequentialist justification for punishment.172  Satisfying vic-
tims’ desire for vengeance “might be an instrumental aim or benefit of
165. Caplan, supra note 93, at 3–4.  Caplan’s argument focused on death row prisoners, but it R
seems likely he would make the same arguments regarding posthumous donation by inmates not
on death row.  If we accept the notion that redemption undercuts the retributive aims of capital
punishment, it seems that the same would be true of other forms of punishment.
166. Id. at 3.
167. See Gardner, supra note 147, at 8 (“[R]etributivism holds that a wrongdoer should be
punished, not for how worthy he or she is as a person, but for what he or she has done.”); Peter
Murphy, Would Donation Undercut the Morality of Execution?, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Oct. 2011, at
13, 14 (“[W]here the prescribed harm is death, killing the prisoner is sufficient for just punish-
ment; this punishment is just even if the prisoner receives some benefit, be it self-praise, redemp-
tion, public recognition, or anything else.”).
168. Gardner, supra note 153, at 8 (citing IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN R
EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT
(1887)).
169. Id.
170. Caplan, supra note 93, at 3. R
171. Gardner, supra note 152, at 8; see also 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1997, at 25 (2006) (“The R
criminal justice system is not operated primarily for the benefit of victims, but for the benefit of
society as a whole.”); Johnson, supra note 159, at 10 (writing that the purpose of capital punish- R
ment is not “to use the murderer’s death as a means to provide satisfaction to the families and
friends of victims of murder”).
172. Gardner, supra note 153, at 8. R
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execution, and a utilitarian might view it as an appropriate justifica-
tion for execution over some other form of punishment, but it is an
aim separate and distinct from retribution.”173  Whatever emotional
reactions this policy might engender from a victim’s friends or family
members, it would not undercut punishment’s retributive
justification.174
Third, Caplan’s argument rests on a speculative assumption regard-
ing the response of a victim’s loved ones to execution.  The possibility
that executed inmates will enjoy acclaim after their decision to donate
might indeed contribute to the emotional damage endured by families
who have suffered unspeakable loss.175  On the other hand, it seems
equally possible that they would take comfort in the inmate’s decision
to donate and the knowledge that others could benefit from the life-
giving gesture in the midst of their pain and the loss they suffered.176
In the case of death row donation, execution “may actually inhibit the
processes of grieving and healing for victims’ friends and family mem-
bers[,]” creating further friction with the fear that allowing donation
would impede families’ grieving.177
And, just as it is speculative to assume a family’s emotional re-
sponse to donation, it is uncertain, if not unlikely, that donors like
Christian Longo—who killed his wife and threw his young children off
a bridge after weighting down their bodies178—would enjoy public ac-
claim sufficient to overcome the condemnation of their conduct.  This
perspective is borne out in a public opinion poll in which the majority
of respondents acknowledged the reprehensible nature of the crimes
committed by death row inmates while indicating that these inmates
should be able to donate their organs.179  Gratitude for the decision to
donate can coexist with disapproval of the conduct that landed the
donor in prison.
Fourth, taken to its logical extreme, the argument that prisoners’
potentially praise-worthy conduct undermines punishment’s retribu-
173. Johnson, supra note 159, at 10. R
174. Gardner, supra note 153, at 8. R
175. And, in fact, family and friends of Longo’s victims are reported to oppose the idea of him
living on in any way through organ donation. See, e.g., Johnny Dodd, Murderer Depicted in
Movie True Story Tells People: ‘I Don’t Feel I Can Be Redeemed,’ PEOPLE (Apr. 17, 2015, 12:45
PM), http://www.people.com/article/true-story-real-life-christian-longo-speaks-out.
176. Gardner, supra note 153, at 8. R
177. Id. (citing evidence from Vik Kanwar, Capital Punishment as “Closure”: The Limits of a
Victim-Centered Jurisprudence, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215 (2002) and Scott Vollum
& Dennis R. Longmire, Covictims of Capital Murder: Statements of Victims’ Family Members
and Friends Made at the Time of Execution, 22 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 601 (2007)).
178. See Finkel, supra note 2. R
179. Lin et al., supra note 22, at 1775 (citing Opinion Polls, supra note 136). R
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tive purpose would prevent all manner of self-improvement by in-
mates.  Prisoners would be unable “to apologize or make amends for
their crimes, to educate themselves or others, to donate money to
charity, to perform the simplest unselfish acts of kindness, to seek re-
ligion, or experience any form of spiritual growth or awakening.”180
The same logic would extend beyond capital crimes and reach equally
to those sentenced to finite periods of confinement.181  Further, it
would wholly eliminate punishment’s potential for rehabilitation.
Thus, even if we assume, despite the foregoing discussion, that poten-
tially redemptive conduct (like organ donation) does have the capac-
ity to undermine retributive aims of punishment, prohibiting this kind
of self-improvement so widely would be poor public policy.
Permitting inmates to donate their organs and other bodily materi-
als posthumously is consistent with the goals of punishment.  Because
there is no principled reason to deny prisoners this option, they should
be allowed the choice whether to become posthumous organ donors
as long as protections are put in place to ensure that the choice is
voluntary and that no inducements that undermine their freedom of
choice or the purposes of punishment are offered.
V. ORGAN DONATION, PRISONER AGENCY, AND REHABILITATION
That there is no clear reason to prevent prisoners from becoming
posthumous organs donors provides a strong argument in favor of al-
lowing them this freedom.  Yet, even more importantly, there is also
an affirmative case for allowing this type of donation:  Permitting in-
mates autonomy over this decision affords them limited agency in a
concrete and controlled realm, in which broader societal goals may be
advanced, as it allows them to effect and display rehabilitation during
imprisonment.
A. Organ Donation and Prisoner Agency
Imprisonment’s defining feature is the restriction of liberty.  In-
mates are confined to a defined area in which their movements, deci-
sion making, and environment are constrained.  Moreover, those
convicted of crimes frequently suffer collateral consequences of con-
viction that endure after release.182  In this context, then, prohibiting
180. Johnson, supra note 159, at 9. R
181. Id. at 9–10 (arguing that Caplan’s argument would “remov[e] any opportunity for re-
form, rehabilitation, penance, or redemption[,]” thwarting both deterrent and retributive aims of
punishment).
182. Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Convic-
tion, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1810 (2012) (listing the collateral consequences of conviction
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prisoners from becoming organ donors is just one feature of a package
of prohibitions that come with conviction.  Yet this prohibition is cate-
gorically different for the inmates who die while still imprisoned be-
cause the restriction endures beyond their sentences and into death.
Thus, restricting the liberty of prisoners in this realm proves, in many
instances, to be a permanent restriction.
Although personal autonomy is a concept that evades simple defini-
tion,183 it is beyond dispute that it is one around which our govern-
ment and social contract are organized.  The U.S. Constitution, for
example, protects positive and negative rights, both “rights to” and
“rights not to,” so that individuals may order their lives in accord with
their own wishes and desires.184  In this sense, autonomy is relative
and descriptive:  It is the extent to which an individual can meaning-
fully govern her affairs.185  Although incarceration does not itself re-
strict inmates’ ability to deliberate, it restricts options from which they
may choose.  By virtue of their incarceration, inmates are less autono-
mous than they would be outside of prison walls.
Allowing donation respects and advances prisoners’ descriptive au-
tonomy because it offers an arena in which they may exercise their
agency.  Permitting donation would grant inmates a private space in
which they could make decisions about the disposition of their bodies
upon their death, free of government intervention,186 while still pre-
serving the purposes and effects of incarceration.  Allowing inmates to
exercise their descriptive autonomy would have benefits than the
approved by the U.S. Supreme Court, including restrictions on the right to vote, serve on a jury,
possess firearms, and occupational restrictions).
183. See generally Fallon, supra note 103 (explaining autonomy as both a descriptive and an
ascriptive concept).
184. Joseph Blocher, Rights To and Not To, 100 CAL. L. REV. 761, 762–63 (2012) (introducing
the concepts of a right “to” and a right “not to” and collecting constitutional embodiments of
those rights); see also Rogers M. Smith, The Constitution and Autonomy, 60 TEX. L. REV. 175,
175 (1982) (citing autonomy as a fundamental constitutional value reflected in cases involving
contraception, abortion, privacy, free exercise, free speech, and procedural due process).
185. Fallon, supra note 106, at 877. But see also infra Part IV (collecting arenas in which the R
U.S. criminal justice system grants inmates some degree of agency).  Descriptive autonomy is
analogous to agency, which one might describe as a means of exercising autonomy.  Agency
might also prove a useful mechanism for distinguishing ascriptive autonomy from descriptive
autonomy; inmates are no less ascriptively autonomous than persons not incarcerated, but they
do have less agency. See infra notes 188–92 (discussing ascriptive autonomy and the effect of R
allowing posthumous organ donation on it).
186. See generally Hashimoto, supra note 106, at 1153 (defining “autonomy” as “the concept R
of private space within which a person can make and act upon decisions free from government
intervention”).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-4\DPL402.txt unknown Seq: 34 11-OCT-16 7:37
1226 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1193
psychic reward of exercising one’s own will.187  In a 1977 study of indi-
viduals who made living donations of kidneys to relatives, donors re-
ported feeling happier and having higher self-esteem after the
donation than before.188  Although posthumous donation differs qual-
itatively from living, directed donation, it is not hard to imagine that
posthumous donation, if allowed, would have a similar effect for an
inmate who chose it during the period between making the choice and
his death.
In contrast to descriptive autonomy, incarceration does not alter in-
mates’ ascriptive autonomy, a concept that “represents the purported
metaphysical foundation of people’s capacity and also their right to
make and act on their own decisions, even if those decisions are ill-
considered or substantively unwise.”189  Autonomy in the ascriptive
sense is not relative; it “is a moral entailment of personhood” and “no
more subject to measurement and comparative assessment than is per-
sonhood itself.”190
Allowing posthumous organ donation appreciates inmates’ ascrip-
tive autonomy, even if it does not advance or enhance it.  Incarcera-
tion, or other means of restricting liberty, does not diminish ascriptive
autonomy because it is synonymous with metaphysical conceptions of
personhood and sovereignty.191  Additionally, permitting or forbid-
ding posthumous organ donation does not make inmates any more or
less human.192  Nonetheless, allowing inmates the opportunity to do-
nate acknowledges their ascriptive autonomy and, in turn, their hu-
manity.193  Donation, when offered as an option in a context in which
there are so many restrictions on descriptive autonomy, might have
the capacity to make prisoners more aware of their ascriptive
autonomy.
187. See Fallon, supra note 106, at 899 (observing that humans “have an interest in living R
descriptively autonomous lives” and that descriptive autonomy “provides the foundation for
pride and satisfaction in a life well-lived”).
188. ROBERTA G. SIMMONS ET AL., Living Related Donors: Cost and Gains, in GIFT OF LIFE:
THE SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 153, 178 tbl.6-2, 179
(1977).
189. Fallon, supra note 103, at 878.
190. Id.
191. See id. at 891 (“[P]eople to whom autonomy is ascribed are neither more or less autono-
mous than anyone else; all competent adult persons possess the right to be self-governing to the
same degree.” (footnote omitted)).
192. See id. at 878 (remarking that ascriptive autonomy equates “personhood with autonomy”
and autonomy “with a moral entitlement to respect for one’s agency,” an idea that originated
with Kant).
193. See id. (“All competent adults possess an equal right to personal sovereignty.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-4\DPL402.txt unknown Seq: 35 11-OCT-16 7:37
2016] POSTHUMOUS ORGAN DONATION 1227
The exercise of agency embodied by a decision of whether to be-
come a posthumous organ donor is the same regardless of whether the
inmate elects to donate.  In either case, the inmate is permitted to
make this decision for himself.  Moreover, the benefits attained by this
decision making in a small but important area of life exist whether the
inmate dies in a way and at a time that makes donation possible.  The
benefits to the donor and to humanity are independent of the actual
end result.
B. Comparable Grants of Agency
Inmates already enjoy some constitutional and statutory affirmative
rights194 that grant them a measure of autonomy in arenas comparable
to posthumous organ donation.  For example, they have a constitu-
tionally protected interest in being able to marry while in prison.195  In
upholding the right of inmates to marry, the U.S. Supreme Court em-
phasized that marriage was an expression of emotional support, public
commitment, and, for some, religious faith.196  Prisons must also af-
ford inmates, even those who are a part of smaller religious sects,
“reasonable opportunities” to exercise their religious faiths.197  In
2000, Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA)198 to protect and accommodate pris-
oners’ religious rights.199  Among other things, RLUIPA protects the
rights of inmates in federal and state prisons to worship freely while
incarcerated.  It prohibits governments from imposing “a substantial
burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to
an institution” unless the imposition both furthers “a compelling gov-
ernmental interest” and is “the least restrictive means of furthering”
that interest.200
194. These affirmative rights stand in contrast to inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (“Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
195. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987) (holding unconstitutional a marriage restriction in
Missouri state prisons, which prohibited marriage except by the prison superintendent’s ap-
proval and only permitted approval for compelling reasons, unconstitutional).
196. Id. at 95–96.
197. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972) (per curiam).
198. Pub. L. No. 106–274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to cc-5
(2012)).
199. Id. § 3(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1).  See Derek L. Gaubatz,
RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and Constitutionality of RLUIPA’s Prisoner Provisions,
28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 514–39 (2005), for more information on RLUIPA and the
elements of a prisoner’s claim for relief under that Act.
200. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).  A rule of general applicability may impose a substantial burden.
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Religious exercise, as defined by the statute, means “any exercise of
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of relig-
ious belief.”201  Thus, a religious exercise under RLUIPA need not be
a religious obligation to merit protection.  This definition, then, fits
within the approach taken by many religious communities, which en-
dorse organ donation as an expression of their beliefs but do not re-
quire it as a tenet of religious practice.202  It remains to be seen
whether restrictions on organ donation further compelling govern-
ment interests and are narrowly tailored,203 but the fact that RLUIPA
would likely recognize organ donation as a religious exercise for relig-
iously motivated inmates means that donation fits within the rubric of
these inmates’ protected liberty interests.  The religious practices
RLUIPA protects are not a far stretch from donation, and the same
justification for allowing prisoners to practice their religious beliefs
should apply to granting them the agency to choose whether to donate
their organs posthumously.
Even for those inmates whose desire to donate their organs is not
religiously motivated, the interests that animate permitting prisoners
to engage in religious rituals might bolster the case for allowing in-
mates the agency to donate.  For example, to the extent that prisons
recognize these religious rituals on death,204 an inmate’s case for do-
nation could be strengthened by the connection to the disposition of
his body upon death.  Alternatively, the desire to donate organs might
be—for some inmates—an expression of the moral, but irreligious,
convictions only incidentally related to what happens to their bodies
after death.205
201. Id. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).
202. See generally Theological Perspectives on Organ and Tissue Donation, UNOS, https://
www.unos.org/donation/facts/theological-perspective-on-organ-and-tissue-donation/ (last visited
Mar. 22, 2014) (restating the positions of dozens of religious organizations).  Scholars and clerics
of Catholicism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, and most Protestant Christian denominations have
expressed their support for organ donation. Id.
203. See generally Jessica Miller, Note, A Life For an Afterlife: Assessing the Potential Re-
demption of Capital Inmates’ Requests to Posthumously Donate Organs Under the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 13 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 87 (2011) (analyzing
RLUIPA’s application to death row inmates’ efforts to donate their organs after execution and
considering whether current methods of execution impose a substantial burden on donation).
204. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TECHNICAL REFERENCE T5360.02, MINISTRY OF BOP CHAP-
LAINS 6 (Nov. 18, 2004), http://www.bop.gov/PublicInfo/execute/policysearch?todo=query&type
=trm (recognizing the right of inmates to have clergy perform various burial rituals).
205. Cf. LONGO, supra note 1, at 9 (asserting that organ donation by inmates cultivates a
“generosity of spirit” and “provides an opportunity to help a fellow citizen who desperately
needs help”).
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C. Agency and Rehabilitation
The benefits derived by a prisoner through his ability to exercise
agency in this limited realm are not the only benefits weighing on the
donor side of the donation equation.  Allowing inmates to become
posthumous organ donors provides an opportunity to reflect rehabili-
tative aims of punishment that might not otherwise be evident, partic-
ularly in the case of death row inmates.206
Like retribution and deterrence, rehabilitation is a commonly cited
purpose of punishment.207  Rehabilitation rests on the foundational
belief that individuals are not inherently criminal.  Instead, various
criminogenic factors based on an inmate’s biology, psychology, and
societal setting drive the decision to engage in criminal activity.  The
rehabilitative approach to punishment seeks to alter the factors likely
to cause criminal behavior by removing the individual from the setting
in which criminality is fostered and to reform him.208  Rehabilitative
punishment, then, “cure[s] the wrongdoer of [his] criminality.”209
In contrast to retribution (and like deterrence), rehabilitation is a
consequentialist justification for punishment; its value lies in its ef-
fect—a reduced probability that the offender will commit again.210
Unlike specific deterrence, however, reduced recidivism is not the sole
justification for punishment under a rehabilitative model.  Rehabilita-
tion transforms individuals who have engaged in criminality; it makes
future criminality less likely because the individual, once rehabili-
tated, is “happier to abide by the law than to break [it],”211 and that
transformation bears fruit other than reduced recidivism.
206. The same would be true of living donation. See Sally Satel, supra note 102 (“Donation
can also be part of rehabilitation, preparing a prisoner for eventual freedom though [sic]
thoughtful decision-making and, ideally, restitution.”).  However, such donations are not the
focus of this Article.
207. See 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1997 (2011) (listing rehabilitation as a purpose of
punishment).
208. Kimberly L. Patch, Note, The Sentencing Reform Act: Reconsidering Rehabilitation as a
Critical Consideration in Sentencing, 39 N. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 165, 171–72
(2013).
209. B. Douglas Robbins, Comment, Resurrection from a Death Sentence: Why Capital
Sentences Should Be Commuted upon the Occasion of an Authentic Ethical Transformation, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 1115, 1132 (2001).
210. Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated
Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1316 (2000).  Specific deterrence
prevents future criminality by “inculcating a greater fear of punishment[,]” while rehabilitation
makes future criminality less likely because punishment changes the character and tendencies of
the punished. But see id. at 1316 n.8 (arguing that specific deterrence is synonymous with
rehabilitation).
211. Id.
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There is, however, broad skepticism about the possibility that reha-
bilitation may truly be successful. Criminals are oftentimes regarded
as a group that exists separate from society and outside morality and,
thus, incapable of rehabilitation.  Providing opportunities for inmates
to rehabilitate themselves undercuts the morality of execution and,
specifically, its retributive aim:  If rehabilitation is, in fact, possible,
then capital punishment curtails the possibility of redemption for a
condemned prisoner.  These fears presuppose that inmates are not ca-
pable or worthy of redemption as an end in itself.212  Reluctance to
permit inmates to act in ways that might redeem or provide growth
opportunities for them arises because it is more comfortable to treat
inmates as less than human and outside our common moral commu-
nity.213  Society expects its members to elect actions such as organ do-
nation, and prohibiting inmates from doing so reinforces the stigma
that places them outside that moral community.  Yet denying the pos-
sibility of rehabilitation to criminals denies our very humanity.
Some commonly cited factors that lead to criminal behavior include
a lack of strong social associations, long-term planning, and empa-
thy.214  Educating inmates about organ donation and allowing them to
decide whether to become posthumous organ donors may provide a
valuable tool for beginning to overcome these very factors.  Gratui-
tous posthumous organ donation requires an individual to think about
the world from the perspective of a critically ill patient and that pa-
tient’s loved ones.  It is a selfless act that binds the donor to the larger
community, both conceptually during life and physically after death.
Moreover, it is the epitome of delayed gratification and long-term
planning because there is no effect until the donor’s death.  Although
providing, at most, one small step toward a prisoner’s rehabilitation, it
is an important step that is distinct from other rehabilitative measures.
Additionally, psychological research illustrates that granting in-
mates more autonomy benefits them by increasing their self-efficacy
and perceived control, the lack of which are predictive of future crimi-
nal behavior.  Self-efficacy is “the conviction that one can successfully
212. See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text (arguing that this fear misunderstands the R
retributive justification for punishment).
213. Johnson, supra note 159, at 10.
214. See, e.g., Joan Gottschall & Molly Armour, Second Chance: Establishing a Reentry Pro-
gram in the Northern District of Illinois, 5 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 31, 67 (2011).  Some crimi-
nogenic factors, like poverty and a lack of educational or vocational training, would not be in
play.
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execute the behavior required to produce outcomes.”215  It reflects
confidence in one’s ability to effectuate desired outcomes.  Perceived
control denotes one’s general expectations about whether one’s be-
havior or external forces control outcomes.  Some psychologists theo-
rize that an internal locus of control leads to self-directed courses of
action, whereas an external locus of control discourages them.216  In-
creases in self-efficacy and perceived control are associated with im-
provements in mental health and well-being;217 in fact, perceived
control may be a better predictor of one’s functioning in society than
actual control.218  Similarly, lower senses of self-efficacy lead to de-
pression and anxiety, whereas greater self-efficacy is associated with
improvements in stress levels, thought control, psychological well-be-
ing, and general functioning.219
To the extent that giving inmates the autonomy to choose whether
to donate their organs posthumously increases their self-efficacy and
perceived control, simply providing the option to register as a donor
improves a prisoner’s psychological and physical health.  Providing in-
mates the opportunity to donate, thus, should contribute to greater
confidence and self-efficacy regardless of the choice made by any
given individual.  Likewise, removing barriers to donation shifts the
locus of control with respect to donation and is, therefore, likely to
begin to overcome learned helplessness.220  This shift, in turn, repre-
sents movement toward becoming a rehabilitated member of society.
For the prisoners who die while still serving their sentences, rehabil-
itation is not a salient penological purpose.221  Nonetheless, allowing
215. Albert Bandura, Self-Efficacy: Toward a Unifying Theory of Behavioral Change, 84
PSYCH. REV. 191, 193 (1977).  Self-efficacy is distinguishable from outcome expectations, the
belief “that a particular course of action will produce certain outcomes.” Id.
216. See, e.g., Barry Zimmerman, Self-Efficacy: An Essential Motive To Learn, 25 CONTEMP.
EDUC. PSYCH. 82, 85 (2000).
217. See Ellen A. Skinner, A Guide to Constructs of Control, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 549, 549 (1996) (collecting studies showing that “across the life span” perceived control is
“related to a variety of positive outcomes, including health, achievement, optimism, persistence,
motivation, coping, self-esteem, personal adjustment, and success and failure in a variety of life
domains”).
218. See id. at 551.
219. Albert Bandura, Perceived Self-Efficacy in Cognitive Development and Functioning, 28
EDUC. PSYCH. 117, 133–34 (1993).
220. See Skinner, supra note 217, at 551 (“[P]rolonged exposure to objective noncontingency
produces cognitive, motivational, and emotional deficits, even in subsequent objectively control-
lable situations.”).
221. This is especially true for death row inmates because capital punishment is said to reject
rehabilitation. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (“[The death penalty] is
unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice.”
(quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (per curiam))).
But see generally Meghan J. Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1231 (2013)
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inmates to donate posthumously creates a vehicle to express rehabili-
tation that might have taken place independent of the opportunity to
donate.  To this extent, it advances society’s interest in punishment’s
potential for rehabilitation.
The experience of Christian Longo bears this point out.  Longo has
written about his own conviction and death sentence, explaining that
after periods of denying guilt and trying to convince himself that his
crimes were unimportant, “the enormity of what [he] did seeped in[,]”
and “remorse and then a wish to make amends” followed.222  Assum-
ing that this is a truthful statement of Longo’s thought processes, this
transformation is an example of rehabilitation that permitting him to
donate his organs would actualize.  Even if it is not a truthful state-
ment, though, allowing Longo to donate his organs posthumously
does no harm, because he would receive no sentence reduction or
other compensation in return.
If we conceive of rehabilitation more broadly, such that it includes
punishment’s capacity to transform the character of the punished,
then creating an opportunity to donate posthumously might facilitate
rehabilitation rather than merely creating an avenue for its expres-
sion.  Allowing inmates to donate could encourage them to reflect on
donation’s potential for them to engage with their community and
make amends.223  Granting inmates, even those the criminal justice
system has condemned to death, the opportunity to help others con-
fers dignity upon them,224 and the importance of human dignity is a
steady undercurrent in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.225  That
same emphasis bears in favor of recognizing inmates’ dignity by giving
them room to make transformative decisions.226  In short, recognizing
inmates’ capacity for good by allowing them to volunteer as posthu-
mous donors might lead them to recognize the same capacity for good
in themselves.
(arguing that the character-transformation component of rehabilitation remains relevant in the
context of capital punishment, in part because it appreciates the humanity of death row
inmates).
222. Longo, supra note 4.
223. Miller, supra note 203, at 135 (asserting that allowing donation after execution encour-
ages inmates “to reflect on [their] own culpability, seek atonement, and ultimately do something
beneficial for society”); see also LONGO, supra note 1, at 9.
224. Miller, supra note 203, at 135–36 (“Post-execution organ donation provides the capital R
inmate with an opportunity to make amends for [her] crime by opting to do something that saves
lives and is useful to society, and thus carries the additional benefit of preserving the dignity of
the condemned.”).
225. Ryan, supra note 220, at 1270. R
226. Cf. id. at 1267 (arguing that there is value in an offender’s reform even outside societal
reintegration).
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Ultimately, offering willing inmates the opportunity to donate their
organs connects them to their community and recognizes them as fully
human members of our moral community.227  Even if the potential
aggregate benefit to patients is small, the benefit to individual inmates
is great, and inviting inmates into the larger moral community benefits
us all.
CONCLUSION
There are certainly less controversial—and more efficient—ways of
increasing the pool of organs available for transplant than turning to
prisoners.  However, a donor-focused analysis reveals that allowing
prisoners to choose whether to become posthumous organ donors
serves a larger social function than can be measured by the effect on
the availability of transplantable organs.  Instead, the benefit to the
prisoners themselves is substantial.  Regardless of whether an individ-
ual prisoner elects to become a donor, the freedom to make the choice
is a positive exercise of agency that does not interfere with the pur-
poses of punishment.  Moreover, the process of learning about organ
donation and deciding whether to become an organ donor provides a
rare opportunity for inmates to effect and display their rehabilitation.
When viewed from this perspective, allowing prisoners to become pos-
thumous organ donors is a larger social good.
227. See Johnson, supra note 159, at 10 (opining that denying inmates the opportunity to per- R
form acts we expect of members of our moral community denies them access to that
community).
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